斉藤　利男(他)、一揆②　一揆の歴史、東京大学出版会、東京、1981年 (Saitō Toshio et al, Ikki (Volume Two) The History of Ikki, Tokyo University Publishing, Tokyo, 1981)

The continuing poor weather that affected the central provinces after 1460 (Chōroku 4) created the conditions for a series of famines that struck in the following year, the year after that, and in the great famine of Kanshō. The Bakufu found itself powerless to address the concerns of the people, and within surrounding provinces large numbers of residents died from hunger or were forced to become vagrants. In 1462 (Kanshō 3), in the 9th month, this culminated in an uprising. The peculiar characteristic about this ikki was that the authority wielded by the various daimyo of the central region was enough to extinguish the uprising before it spread. It featured ikki leaders such as Renta Hyōe (蓮田兵衛, who was later executed for his role in the uprising, and retributions against the villages of Uga Tsujiko and Matsuzaki, as well as further punishments for the leaders from the villages of Taketa, Fushimi, and Yamashina. It appears that the great famine of Kanshō weakened the strength of the villages that engaged in the ikki, yet encouraged an uprising on the part of lower level samurai and citizens of the city.(85)

In 1463 (Kanshō 4), and in 1465 (Kanshō 6) an ikki once again broke out within the precincts of Kyoto. The uprising of `65 started in the region of Nishioka, and the official charged with suppressing it, the Shitsuji (執事) of the Mandokoro (政所) Ise Sadachika banned the hikan dogō of Nishioka from attempting to call for a Tokusei edict. Yet on the other hand, we see that the Nishioka dogō themselves were prepared to assist the Bakufu in quelling the uprising. (85)  Immediately before the outbreak of the Ōnin War, in 1466 (Bunshō 1) amidst an ever-increasing financial crisis, a number of Tokusei edicts were issued for the hikan of the Yamana and Asakura daimyo. The fact that the uprisings were unconnected to the call for a tokusei from the Bakufu, and the fact that a tokusei was called in order to prevent groups of warriors from stealing men and produce marks a change in the ties between tokusei and ikki. The other point that needs mentioning is the appearance of ikki `taishō`, or leaders.(86)

In the uprisings that occurred after 1462 (Kanshō 3), there is an increase in the number of names used by ikki leaders. In the past, for example in the case of the Fushimi shōen ikki, a conflict that produced a great number of dead (1433, Eikyō 5), when the Bakufu issued an order for the arrest of the ringleaders it merely said 「土一揆所行之間、誰を張本（はりもと）とも申し難き」（看聞御記）. In the Kakitsu ikki that produced such a fine organization, none of the leaders names were ever published or made known. The ikki itself was an act on the part of a sō village that had united under the ceremony of ichimi shinsui. Hence the appearance of an ikki leader, which went against the entire concept of `ikki`, meant that the ikki concept itself was undergoing a change. In an ikki held in 1462 (Kanshō 3), the record mentioned that 「大名之内者又土一揆引き渡者と号し所々に乱入せしむ」（大乗院寺社雑事記）. The ikki before the Ōnin War featured the inclusion of deputies from daimyo households and akutō drawn out of the city of Kyoto, in other words the lower rungs of the Kyoto social scale and the peasantry. These groups were then led by an ikki `taishō` (or so it is thought). The epithet of `general` (taishō) would later go on to be applied to the position of ashigaru taishō. These particular individuals were involved in an ikki not with the intention of retaking land, as was the case with most village ikki, but through the issue of a private tokusei they attempted to `survive`, or at least create a living for themselves. It was a movement that only increased the decay and corruption of the state.(86)

The fifteenth century and the development of the jizamurai class through `tokusei`:

The early fifteenth century had already borne witness to the polarization within villages between the common peasantry and the wealthier jizamurai class, who bore weapons and surnames. In or around 1430, this particular division into two classes changed the appearance of the shōke ikki. Through compromise with the shōen owners, the jizamurai class took on a role as one part of the system of control of the land owner, and by doing so raised their profile within the village itself. In contrast, the common peasantry began to exhibit signs that they were prepared to break through the burden of interest that they bore as peasants. Yet the shōke ikki continued to play a role as a place where both sides joined together as shōen residents, and continued much as the sō had done before. Within tokusei ikki, this again was a bedrock upon which the sō came together as one. However, as most of the profits from tokusei edicts fell into the hands o f the jizamurai class, the division within the villages became more pronounced.(87)

Even though the commoners would be temporarily protected from high interest rates by the issue of tokusei, tithes continued to be collected as before by shōen owners, the Bakufu, and shugo, or else severe weather conditions continued, hence the borrowing of cash and rice and the sale of lands continued unabated. As the problem of interest surrounding tokusei provided the basis for the outbreak of ikki, the manner of making demands via tokusei as before began to grow more problematic. The organizational and political abilities of the jizamurai class, as well as their capacity to launch protests (as many tokusei and tsuchi ikki had done in the past) were weakening as they became affiliated with the shōen owners, and the strength that the ikki once held could not be fully realized.In 1459 (Chōroku 3), Tōji issued a Kishomon to the residents of Kami and Shimo Kuse shōen, warning them not to participate in a tokusei ikki. The interesting thing about this document is that the signatures of the samurai class and those lower on the social scale were made on separate sheets, meaning that the division within the villages was now being officially recognized by the shōen owner.(88)

On the other hand, those in authority had been sparing no effort in trying to make the jizamurai class the basis of their authority. In the 1430s, the shugo, in a move against the Kyoto shōen, had attempted to make both those of the myōshu class and samurai bearing surnames make reports, or else they had tried to have their influence soak into the village system by means of taxation. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, such moves by the shugo would raise the ire of the villagers and result in protest, however by the end of the fifteenth century, jizamurai, who had become hikan of the shōen owner in response to efforts by that same owner to actively expand his power and secure his profits, became more prominent. There was thus an increase in the military burden and regional activity of the jizamurai, which then involved the sō villages that they held under their leadership. By means of the sō and jizamurai, villagers, kokujin, daimyo, and the Bakufu, in a reflection of the political situation, began to construct a system of mutual assistance.(88)

The Ōnin War and ikki:

In 1467 (Ōnin 1) and the outbreak of civil unrest, one does not see any records for tokusei within the evidence for the period in question. Certainly villages became involved in the maelstrom, for the sō considered it their primary duty to protect their lives and produce from being seized as war tax or use as soldiers. As far as the villages were concerned, unrest was not something that came from outside the village, for as we have seen, the village system itself was capable of creating unrest within. Hence village struggles did not take on the form of resistance against unrest itself in order to expel it, but took on a form in which it might profit most from the least amount of loss. Proof of this is seen in the appearance of `Tachimi` (立身), who became involved in many disputes as individual ashigaru under the leadership of kokujin status jizamurai. Although the fighting by the sō in the midst of chaos was ostensibly to protect its own property, one cannot deny that disorder allowed for the violent contrast between uniting and dividing sō organizations. The devastation caused by disorder was lightened, and the unions formed as a basis for fighting reorganized themselves to emerge as a new topic for the sō after the unrest subsided.(89)

In 1477 (Bunmei 9), after fighting in the capital had subsided, a tokusei was once again demanded. Again, in the ikki of 1480 (Bunmei 12), Tamba, Yamashiro, Yamato, and Harima all rose up in revolt, making it the largest uprising of its kind for some time. The ikki of Kyoto were successful in having a new gate constructed at Shichiguchi torn down, yet they were not able to receive an edict of pardon. The percentage of ikki stemming from villages during this period is fairly low, and of the tokusei ikki that were produced by the end of the Bunmei era, there were no ikki from villages around the Kyoto region. The main activities regarding ikki now involved akutō of Kyoto and hikan of daimyo. Amidst the changes that had occurred to the basis of ikki within the villages, demands for tokusei from the Bakufu and fighting that occurred around the issue of private tokusei began to take a main role in the fighting of the villagers.(89)

Many shōen were overthrown by the disorder of the time, which saw kokujin and daimyo come to exercise their authority, or else the shōen were re-organized under alternative systems of control by their owners. Original tithe amounts and the addition of newly acquired lands were combined, hence through authority tithes were standardized in a single format. Tokusei were part of the political strategy of control for the daimyo, hence ikki and tokusei were separated into two `measures`. The authority of the daimyo came through the removal of the jizamurai class from the sō village level, and their use of these warriors as the basis of authority in order to strengthen their means to control a province. Fighting to resist this attempt to capture territory by means of united daimyo forces meant that the peasantry faced new dilemmas.(90)

Events in Yamashiro between the Hatakeyama and the Hosokawa and its effect on central villages:

Apparently both armies had engaged in the looting and burning of villages, thus destroying the livelihoods of the inhabitants and raising their ire against these marauding armies. The peasantry and manufacturer classes started to raise their voices in support of the withdrawal of both armies, a point that gradually spread throughout the sō village and further afield. As far as the kokujin were concerned, the villages under their jurisdiction were being destroyed, meaning that their income and the opportunity for expansion of their forces were being eroded. Moreover, these kokujin felt an acute sense of danger that their territory might be seized by forces from another province, thus an attempt was made on behalf of ten representatives of the kokujin class to call for an end to hostilities. In the tenth month of 1482, on the 11th day, a union of kokujin members and the peasantry from throughout Yamashiro gathered together in a `gun shū`, (群集) demanding the withdrawal of both armies from the province. If this was not done, then they (the Kanrei and Hatakeyama) would be attacked by the forces of the province. These kokujin continued in their planning against the forces of the warring factions, until on the 17th they convinced both armies to depart Yamashiro. Hence these kokujin members of Yamashiro managed to drive out both armies and based on a three point article, rule over the province in stead of the Hatakeyama. (98)

A particular characteristic of this sōkoku ikki was a denial of the authority of the shugo, and an ikki in which the kokujin of a province secured the right to rule over that province. Yet this form of ikki also featured a gathering of kokujin and `the gun shū of commoners from throughout the province`.(95) The sum total of this particular argument was that in the shōen system of the central region, the shōen owner, shugo, kokujin, and peasantry all had their own interests, which saw an increase in conflicts throughout the period in question. Both the kokujin and the sō village held their own logic backing their actions, which is why this in itself was so representative of ikki as a whole.(97) The entire phenomenon of the Yamashiro kuni ikki saw the creation of a two tiered form of ikki – one including a collection of kokujin, and the other consisting of a gun shū of peasantry, or an ikki by the kokujin and another by the peasantry. Whilst it managed to confine the most basic of disputes to an internal conflict, the kokujin ikki took command, and thus enabled the ikki to drive out those forces from other provinces. In this sense, smaller land owners made their allegiances with both types of ikki. From 1485 through to 1493 the province was run by this ikki of kokujin, whereas the ikki formed by the peasantry of the sō villages, as an ikki of the non-controlling classes, placed what demands they had on the sō kuni. Based on these premises, it is important to distinguish a sō koku ikki from a kokujin ikki (as their motives were different, as were their outcomes).(98)

The development of the sōkoku ikki:

1485 (Bunmei 17) In relation to the uprising within Yamashiro, diaries of court officials and the Daijōin record state that these actions were the work of `a group of 36 individuals from throughout the province` and that `a group of kokujin of Yamashiro were of one mind with regard to this action`. What is clear is that this was an ikki by 36 kokujin level citizens of Yamashiro, who had decided on the proscriptions that would apply to the province, and would adopt a system of self-government. Moreover, in 1486, an order for hanzei to be paid by the `sōkoku` of Sugai shōen (part of the territory of Daijōin) shows that these kokujin had adopted the name of `sōkoku` to describe the organization that had arisen since they had adopted control over the province. So what was the `sōkoku`? (93)

This particular ikki was not formed with the purpose of establishing a separate system on a kuni or gun level, but was formed around a union of kokujin who had gathered together based on economic factors and conditions. However, the kokujin who had formed this ikki were called `the citizens of the province of Yamashiro` and had established a proscription against the armies of the Hatakeyama from `entering the province` (from the Zatsujiki 雑事記). It is true that the southern part of Yamashiro, for which Ujigawa was the border, had been regarded as a `kuni` for quite some time. In this sense, the `koku` spoken of by the kokujin referred to this degree of territory. As for the `sō`, in the same manner as the sōson and sōgō (惣郷), an organization that was formed from the amalgamation of both of these groups came to be described as a `sōkoku`, and the territory they ruled over was a `koku`.(94)

In addition to appropriation of the right to collect hanzei, the sōkoku ikki also adopted the rights of trial and investigation, a degree of authority that previously had only been exercised by the Bakufu and shugo. The sōkoku appeared to have adopted the right to execute these laws and privileges, and the province system they adopted was meant to be applied as an equivalent to the shugo system of authority. Yet they did not inherit these rights from the Bakufu or shugo, and neither were they appointed as representatives of the shugo. For example, the right to investigate and trial were, in the latter medieval period, not confined to the shōen owner or shugo yet were rights that were held by local land owners and the sōson and sōgō. As far as the sōson were concerned, the practice of such authority was an important pillar to sustain independent rule. Hence the ikki, while denying the authority of the shugo, appropriated the most powerful of authoritative rights for themselves as a `kuni`.(94)

Characteristics of the sōkoku ikki:

In addition to the withdrawal of both armies from the province, the second condition laid down by the ikki was that they would assume direct control over the territory of shrines and temples, and that the temples and shrines themselves would not be allowed to assume direct control of their territory. One of the main factors that provided a common basis for the kokujin was the fact that they had all served as officials on Sugai shōen. In order to win back former territory that had been lost through war, temples and shrines had not choice but to abandon their officials. Direct rule meant that at the same time as recovering their territory, the temples and shrines would recover the rights that had been appropriated by the sōson and sōgō.(96)

However, the dismissal of officials and imposition of direct rule had been a prime cause of conflict with rural villages. Hence the proscriptions imposed by the sōkoku were certainly a point that united the concerns over profits of the kokujin, peasantry, and merchants of the shōen. In this sense, there have been those scholars who look upon the Yamashiro kuni ikki as a form of peasant war, or as a conflict between competing non-controlling classes. This type of thinking tended to association the social class of the kokujin as synonymous with the dogō, or middle sort of non-ruling class, who dictated the actions of the sōson, and acted as leaders of the peasantry.(96) While it is true that the 36 leaders of the sōkoku were described as `kokujin`, they could not be compared to the `sōkoku ryōshu` such as the Kobayakawa of Aki province or the Kuki (朽木) of Ōmi province. Yet in Yamashiro province there were no `kokujin ryōshu`, merely hikan and geshi of shōen within the province. For example, the Makishima (槇嶋) of Uji had been seeking to expand their influence by engaging in territorial invasions and the seizure of offices, and were thus going beyond the category of a shōen official of a single shōen. This was opposed by the kokujin of nearby shōen, and led to disputes with the peasantry of the opposing shōen. What is clear is that these kokujin were aiming at increasing their control over the peasantry through co-operation with one another. While the scale of the territory that they themselves controlled was small, a combination of their territory and their political stance put them in the same league as the `kokujin ryōshu` of other provinces. They weren`t aiming at leading the peasantry, their interest was in maintaining control over their territory and maintaining their position.(97)

In contrast to this, the sōson were predominantly led by `satajin` and `bantō`, who opposed the shōen ruler and kokujin, and who sought to strengthen the cohesion of their groups and secure the profits of the peasantry. Hence what we can state about the sōkoku was that the 36 members of the sōkoku leadership were derived from the hikan relations between the Hosokawa, Kokujin, and small scale ryōshu, and that their leadership affected the direction of the sōson. Despite this, the late fifteenth century was an age in which the shōen owner, shugo, kokujin, and peasantry competed against one another fiercely over plots of land. The kokujin and peasantry used a number of strategies to overcome the sort of logic used by the hikan. This in itself was the logic of ikki.(97)

Development of the Kaga Ikkō Ikki:

In 1504 (Eishō 1), Kajūji Masanori wrote a letter to Sanjō Nishi Minotada describing those events that had occurred in Kaga as thus:
江州なとハ久しく不知行の間、是非に及ばず候、播州・丹州ことごとく近年不知行に候、加州一所懸命に候ところ、ただ臨時の損亡なとハ、その年ばかりの迷惑に候[　]、それさへ毎年申様候、結句、応仁天下の乱の砌、土貢を減じ、あまつさえそれ已後また山川崩れ砂入るなと二、田地荒はてたるとて、余り半分これを減じ、百姓雅意に任せ候、相残る年貢ハ、国の引き物、先規のごとく引取、なお残る分ハ代官の徳分に成候、しかしながら有名無実の間、連年借物をもって出頭の処、たちまちこの一両年事尽き候、さすが加賀土貢数ある事にて候、下向せしめ、きとハ不知に応ぜずとも、連々おとしすかし調法せしめ（後略）(99)

The more noteworthy thing about this quote is that it illustrates that the temple owner of the shōen in question, right up until the out break of the Ōnin War, had found that the resident land owners and the peasantry had been seizing land for themselves. The same went for the land owners in Etchū. It is on this particular point that the ikki of Kaga shared something in common with those of the Kinai. What the document also states is that control over the territory in question was thrown into doubt, and explains how this process came about. Those peasants who were assembled in the sō village system had begun to engage in fighting over reductions in tithes as a result of `natural devastation` (田地荒) and had attempted to reduce the authority of the shōen owner. The daikan of the shōen were also not paying their tithes, and were retaining them for their own use. The author of the letter thus states that the chaos of Ōnin and Bunmei were in direct correlation to the drop in income from tithes.(99)

The local landowners, in their principle territory and that of their deputies, came up with various means by which they could gain a surplus from the labour of the peasantry throughout the fifteenth century. The daikan of Takase shō in Tonami gun of Etchū came up with a temporary tax on provincial duties, and set about attempting to strengthen his means of collecting such taxes (from the Tōdaiji Monjo). The temple of Sōjiji (総持寺) in Noto had those wealthy farmers working on temple lands appointed as hikan to the temple together with a promise for aid, and thus was able to increase the amount of tithes that were being collected by the temple (from the Sōjiji Monjo). Again, in 1478 in Noto, those shugo hikan, as newly appointed territorial hikan, were ordered to enter their territories and extract tithes under directives. Those older directives that had dictated tithe collection were removed, thus leading to double the income, a strengthened system through revision, and an improved system of measures to deal with any malfeasance, including confiscation of land after a survey was conducted. (from the Susujinja Monjo).(100)

According to the author, the peasantry had no choice but to resist this attempt to increase the authority and control of the land owners. Yet the attempts at forced extraction of tithes by the land owners was eventually directly applied to the authority of the shugo and the use of that authority, leading to the outbreak of violent incidents.(100) (Thus indicating that the author believes that the Hokuriku was mostly defined by a polarization of shōen between land owners and sō villagers). In 1474 (Bunmei 6), right in the middle of the Bunmei no ran and an inter-family dispute about the position of shugo of Kaga province by Togashi Masachika and his younger broker Yukichiyo, the first ikkō ikki of Kaga occurred. The ikkō ikki were allied with Masachika and attacked Rentaiji, into which Yukichiyo had fled. Eventually the position of shugo was handed back to Masachika.

Yet in the 3rd month of the following year a conflict had broken out between the ikkō ikki itself and Masachika, which ended in defeat for the Monto. Yet the military strength of Honganji had not been demolished. If one examines the records of the shōen owners for this time, uprisings by the ikkō shū within the shōen occurred almost regularly from the first uprising onwards, yet at the same time conflict against the shugo and jito grew in strength.(100)

(There follow quotes from the Ofumi from Bunmei 6 and 7) There was an increasing trend towards ignoring payment of tithes and other public duties towards the shugo and jitō, yet it was no accident that these were years in which ikkō ikki broke out in Kaga. This situation was not limited to Kaga either. In 1481 (Bunmei 13) the ikkō ikki of Tonami gun of Etchū (the same ikki forces from Kaga that fled following their defeat to Masachika) launched an attack against the kokujin status retainer Ishiguro Mitsuyoshi and the followers of Sōkaiji, a Tendai sect temple of the Ikuōsan line (both of whom had originally aimed to burn down Zuisenji in an act of suppression against the ikkō sect). This particular increase in control over Etchū by the ikkō sect was aimed, in the words of the author, at resistance against the land owning class (or so the Tōsōki claims). The leaders of this ikki (who aren`t named) thus joined the peasantry of Takase shōen (property of Tōdaiji) in refusing to pay tithes on a yearly basis. Hence the fighting of the ikkō sect included an aspect of forcing the previous owners of the shōen to relinquish their authority to a new force.(101)

(There follows a description of the downfall of Masachika). Those who chose to ally themselves with Masachika included the Tsukihashi and the Yamakawa, shugodai families, and `the land owning class who acted as deputies to the shugo and fought with vigour against the ikkō ikki`, many of whom met the same fate as Masachika. (This interpretation overlooks the extent to which kokujin were allied to the ikkō sect, and thus can only be regarded as an outdated view). The author of the article has mostly projected the situation regarding villages within the Kinai region onto those of the Hokuriku and drawn the same conclusion, that there was a polarization between the peasantry and land owning class, without considering whether both sides, in their relationship to the ikkō sect, might have sought each other`s assistance in removing the authority of the shugo and shōen owner. In other words, the author has treated the subject as a strict example of late fifteenth century ikki without considering the capacity of the Jōdō Shinshū faith nor its system of operation to create the means for hikan to operate on behalf of the Monto, a Monto drawn together from multiple villages.

At any rate, the Chōkyō ikki saw the removal of Masachika from the political scene of Kaga, and within Kaga itself, those land owning forces that had allied themselves to the shugo in an attempt to expand their authority and strengthen their hold on their lands disappeared, leaving just the Monto, or those land owners who continued to oppose the Ikkō sect. Afterwards, Togashi Yasutaka and his followers became shugo (in name only), with powerful kokujin and local landlords continuing to hold authority over the province. As far as the ikki was concerned, they had removed the head of the Bakufu-shugo system and thus continued to invade shōen properties as they had before.(103)

Small land owners and the sōson:

As a result of arguments over reductions in tithes and non payment of tithes, the shōen owners and local landowners fought over the right to control such land. While this continued, what were the peasantry doing in order to secure a stable life and capture further territory?

Within the village of Soe in the shōen of Kuratsuki in Kahoku gun, there was a Shinshū temple by the name of Soebō (諸江坊). This temple had housed the records handed down from Shōjūji of the sankoku of Echizen, within which 10 items refer to the sale of lands and purchase of land. One of these documents relates to a sale that took place in 1519 (Eishō 10) on the 10th day of the first month, when a villager by the name of Jōshō (浄正) was involved in the sale of an official establishment and its lands to the temple for 230 ho (歩). According to the details, the land on which the building dwelt was then sold by the owner for 4 kan 300 mon, thereafter every year 170 mon would be paid to the official, with the temple to pay the remaining 1 kan 400 mon. Previously Jōshō had only had to pay the 170 mon to the official, and would be able to do what he liked with the rest. However, the right to collect 400 mon as interest on the land would be sold to the temple. The temple subsequently bought the right to interest. On the bill of sale the sōson of Soe had its seal affixed along with the seller, which guaranteed that the sale had taken place. The temple, though collecting other bills of sale managed to accumulate a significant number of rights to interest on land, most of which was described as `tithes`.(104)   

Immediately before the outbreak of the Chōkyō ikki, an incident occurred within Yokokita gō in Enuma gun to avoid having to pay their tithes to the shōen owner Rinkōin (of Shōkokuji). Rinkōin, as the estate owner, normally would collect 200 mon in annual tithes, half of which would be paid to the hondokoro of Anrakukō-in (located on the estate). However, Anrakukō-in, in league with 10 members of the local Monto, in addition to the 100 mon that it would receive as tithes demanded an extra 50 mon that would be extracted from the annual tithe meant for Rinkōin. The remaining 50 mon (meant for Rinkōin) would then be distributed among the 10 Monto, this way ensuring that no tithes were paid to the estate owner. As a result of this measure, these 10 Monto members would be able to receive part of the annual tithe for themselves. Shōen owners often cited non payment of tithes as evidence that the peasantry were negligent in their duties, or else brought about by illegal acts by the daikan.(105-06)

In the case of Yokokita gō, the daikan and peasantry had joined together in order to split up the payments that would ordinarily be paid to the estate owner – itself not a rare episode. The daikan did not have the strength to be able to fight both the estate owner and the peasantry at the same time, thus in order to be able to use the right to accumulate tithes (a right that had be seized), the daikan decided that a compromise with the peasantry was a better option. Of the tithes that had been seized, one section went to the sōson, whilst another part was paid to the local small land owners (of dogō status). These landowners, who in the midst of the sōson and their actions on behalf of the sōson managed to gain partial payments drawn from their own lands, continued on their own to accumulate rights to collection of tithes, a practice made possible by the institution of the sōson. They took these profits and paid them directly to either the sō or the local temple. This shared wealth among the peasantry meant that their own economic basis and the sō institution became one and the same. According to the author, if a kokujin, with a mind to taking the small land owners right to collect tithes, attempted to enter the sōson in order to increase his revenue, the small land owners of the sō, with their self rule and beliefs, would organize the peasantry to defend these two concepts, which at the same time would protect their own profits. This development was something that the sō and the Shinshū temples would risk their lives to preserve.(106)

Yet the average peasant and indentured peasant would not ally themselves with a small landowner to defend such abstract concepts as self rule and faith. The sō village denied the attempt at collection of increased tithes by shōen owners and local landlords. Whilst damaging the right to collect tithes by the shōen owner, the sō village would accumulate the excess produce of the estate. For example, if the right to gain added income for increased cultivation of lands meant that profits were accumulated by local landlords and small landowners, as long as there was no increase in direct control based on the authority of the landlord, there was a strong possibility that the peasantry themselves would stabilize the administration of their estate. Hence the ikkō ikki, and the system of rule of Kaga, at the very base level, was a type of sō village ikki, which gave Kaga the characteristics that saw it through into the Sengoku era.(106) 

The sōkoku ikki of Kaga:

After the Ōnin War, the landowning classes in various regions attempted to increase the degree of authority they exercised, thus eliminating enemies but continuing the conflicts. There were those groups who attempted to increase the authority that was attached to the rights and privileges of the shugo, and there were those who through their faith (or using faith as a ally) managed to practically deny the authority of the shugo and form of an ikki of kokujin. The former sort of landowner made an active effort to increase the authority they held over the sō villages, thus leading to a sharp backlash from the villages. Those peasant ikki which were eventually led by the ikkō shū very quickly joined the kokujin ikki and brought down the shugo.(107)

The ikki of Chōkyō was led by Torigoe (鳥越) (河北郡) of Kōganji (弘願寺), Yoshifuji (吉藤) (石川郡) of Senkōji (専光寺), Isobe (礒部) (河北郡) of Shōganji (勝願寺) and Kigoshi (木越) (河北郡) of Kōtokuji (光徳寺), the so called `monks of the four temples`, who bound together, leading some 40,000 temple related members made up of 同宿 and 若党. Moreover, in Ishikawa gun there appeared the figures of Sunosaki (洲崎) Izumi Nyūdo Keigaku, Sunosaki Jurō Saei`mon Jō Hisayoshi, Kawaii Tō Saei`mon Jō Norihisa, Ishiguro Mago Saei`mon Masasue (正末) led some 10,000 followers, whereas Kasama Hyoe Ietsugu led around 7,000 followers of the Kawa shū(鞹), and Yasuyoshi Gen Saei`mon Jō Ienaga led some 8,000 followers of the Kawahara shū (河原衆). Yamamoto Enshō Nyudō Yuken together with 10 retainers brought 10,000 troops, whereas Takahashi Shinei`mon Nobushige brought 5,000 mounted troops divided into six groups (according to the Kanchiron). The armies led by the Kawaii, Yasuyoshi, Yamamoto, and Takahashi would go on to form the Kawaii gumi, Kawahara gumi, Jūnin gumi, and the Rokka gumi, all of which were recorded in Shōnyo`s `Tenbun Nikki`. (107)

 In short, the organizations that came to be referred to as the gumi were derived from the military organizations of the Chōkyō ikki. These kumi were thus referred to in 1519 (Eishō 10) in the 守光公記 as `the kumi perform the same role as the ikki chū`. The basic kō institution, which formed the basis of the Monto organization and which consisted of peasants of sō villages drawn together from across the region formed the basis for the ikki. These peasants then, in the case of Yasuyoshi and Yamamoto (both of which were landowners), together with small landowners joined together in the ikki chū, and were led by those with military experience.(107-08) The ikki organization that constituted a broad area of villages and members underwent further organization during the Bunmei period, resulting in the appearance of the Gun and the Gun Ikki Chū. Their appearance signaled a development in the political organization of the Kaga ikki system according to Gun (regional) affiliation. The Gun (in their role as an ikki) were brought together on a provincial basis as the `four Gun`. In the ikki that took place in Etchū in 1504, this organization appears as the `Etchū Yon Gun Chū` (越中国四郡坊主文書).(108)

The Gun was formed from among the members of the kumi, and through yoriai and katariai its measures were decided. Via these means the landowning classes brought the upper echelons of the ikki organization under their control, which meant that the ikkō ikki was in reality a kokujin ikki. Moreover, the ikki reflected the desires of the local landlords, meaning that their invasion of properties was tacitly approved, and took no measures to try to curb the activities against the rights of the shōen owners.(108)

On the other hand, Honganji attempted to answer the demands of the Bakufu and shōen owners, and dispatched orders to cease invasions of property or non payment of tithes, and sent down orders to Kaga to that effect.(108) In the Tenbun Nikki for 1543 (Tenbun 12) under an entry for the 9th day of the 10th month, a certain Izumi Yajirō of the Naka no in territory refused to pay his tithes, hence the Naka no in requested the Gunyo (gumi) chū act to ensure that Izumi paid those taxes, stating that as the owners of the territory, they demanded that Izumi`s lands be confiscated (in a statement to Shōnyo, hence Izumi was thought to have Shinshū ties). Yet Shōnyo was not able to acquiesce with this, and sent a `moshitsuke` to Izumi, instructing him to quickly pay his tithes. Again, when Chōshōji invaded the territory of Shibayama shōen, part of the territory of the Godai (belonging to the shōgun), the shōgun released a private document asking for the invasions to cease, and since Chōshōji representatives were in the capital, they ordered that this information be relayed to Chōshōji by Shōnyo. In response, Shōnyo wrote a document stating that Chōshōji would no longer engage in invasions and sent this to the shōgun. Of course, orders pertaining to non payment of tithes and invasions of property could be delivered from Honganji to the Gun, yet there was no system that could force either the Gun or kumi to desist their activities.(109)

The right to rule over the shōen had been appropriated by the ikkō ikki after it had assumed command over the province. Yet within the Honganji – gun-kumi relationship, measures to fully implement rule over the shōen and prevention of violence were ineffective, which meant that even if an order to cease and desist were issued, it had no actual impact. On the other hand, Honganji would issue documents outlining its `desire` to have tithes collected, or call for punishment against those who would `transgress` or be of a different mind to Honganji (別心). This meant that the Gun could lose territory, and the roles within it could be passed on to others. Yet this was no more than the exercise of religious authority, the practicality of which had limits, meaning that Honganji and the gun did not have a relationship in which the authority of Honganji extended to every province and every gun within that province thus securing the right of rule of the territory, and did not have the authority to changes the distribution of territory nor change the ownership of the said territory. In the case of Kaga, it had its own precepts, meaning that the collection of tithes and other produce was decided at the local level, meaning that neither Honganji nor the Gun could demand that action be taken on the local level.(109)

As such, the sō village and sō gō resisted the attempt of the landowner to strengthen his grip over territory, and by utilizing local self –government they strongly resisted the system of control exercised by the landowners. The basis of this resistance came through the peasant ikki. Ikki by the land owning class tied itself to this institution, and for the first time overthrew the rule of the shugo and grabbed the right to rule over the province for themselves. By again forming an ikki consisting of multiple levels of classes, they realized their control over the peasantry, continued to invade territory, and formed Gun organizations. These manifested themselves in the form of the Kaga ikkō ikki and the sōkoku ikki. This muli-layered organization, based around self government, created its own method of administration in which Honganji only possessed a few rights of its own, thereby ensuring that a prioritized system of control from above would not be allowed.(110)

The rule of Kaga after the ikki of Chōkyō - The involvement of Ikkō temples with the Bakufu:

How was Kaga ruled by the ikkō sect after the overthrow of Masachika? An example of how this situation developed can be judged by examining the events that occurred on Fukuda shō in Enuma gun on what was the property of Kitano shrine. From the Bunmei era onwards, the daikan of Fukuda shō was Shikichi Hikouei`mon Jō Zenshun. This particular Shikichi was most likely a descendant of Karuno Shikichi Hiko Gorō Yoritada who had received the position of jitō as well as head of duties of Sugao shrine and Surō from the shogun Yoshimasa. Shichiki had become the daikan after releasing an okifumi stating that he would increase the tithe intake from the estate. However as non-payment of tithes had continued, in 1487 (Chōkyō 1) he had been punished with expulsion from the estate. His relative Shikichi Hiko Kurō Eimon Jō had then been appointed to the position of daikan, yet after two years a total of 220 kanmon had still not been paid to Kitano shrine, hence the intervention of the Mibu family and Habahakube 波々伯部 family finally brought the sum to be paid down to 70 kanmon.(102)

On the 2nd day of the 10th month of 1489, the Bakufu had ordered Shikichi Hikouei`mon Jō to cease and desist from imposing on the territory of the shrine, whilst at the same time ordering the shrine daikan to assume all duties on the estate, and ordering all of those of myōshu status on the estate to cease aiding Shikichi in his activities and to ensure that all tithes were being paid promptly. On the same day, the Bakufu addressed the myōshu of Nagasaki no Ho, Nishi Kasama no Ho, and Toyoda no Ho, entreating them to make the peasants fulfill their duties and collect tithes.(102)

In the 10th month of 1491, again Shikichi had claimed `recalcitrance on the part of the peasants` for the non-payment of tithes. To counter this, the shrine dispatched a messenger with orders to the `myōshu hyakushō chū` and Shōkōji to investigate whether it was the peasants, Shikichi, or some form of calamity that was preventing payment of the tithes, and if so, to resolve the situation. Apparently the shrine expected that Shōkōji would comply with the messenger and persuade the peasantry to pay their tithes. In 1485, when property invasions had occurred at Kuratsuki shō, and again in 1514 and the property invasions of Hiyoshi shrine, orders (or requests) for cooperation from Shōkōji had been released.(102)

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